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GRACE AND CONTROLLING 
WHAT WE DO NOT CAUSE
Kevin Timpe
Eleonore Stump has recently articulated an account of grace which is neither 
deterministic nor Pelagian. Drawing on resources from Aquinas's moral psy­
chology, Stump's account of grace affords the quiescence of the will a signifi­
cant role in an individual's coming to saving faith. In the present paper, I first 
outline Stump's account and then raise a worry for that account. I conclude 
by suggesting a metaphysic that provides a way of resolving this worry. The 
resulting view allows one to maintain both (i) that divine grace is the efficient 
cause of saving faith and (ii) that humans control whether or not they come 
to saving faith.
I. Introduction
Christianity holds that human agents are fallen and in need of salvation.1 
It also holds that humans are not able to save themselves; they are instead 
saved by divine grace. For example, Augustine writes that "unless this 
[sinful] will, then, is freed by the grace of God from the servitude by which 
it has been made a 'servant of sin,' and unless it is aided to overcome its 
vices, mortal men cannot live rightly and devoutly."2 Aquinas echoes this 
sentiment: "a man cannot perform meritorious deeds without grace."3 
And the Council of Trent declares that "the efficient cause [of our justifica­
tion is] the God of mercy who, of his own free will, washes and sanctifies, 
placing his seal and anointing with the promised holy Spirit who is the 
guarantee of our inheritance."4 It is clear that in affirming that humans are 
saved by divine grace, Christian orthodoxy is denying that humans are 
able to be the efficient cause of their own saving faith in Christ.5 One way 
to insure that God is the efficient cause of an individual's coming to faith 
is by embracing theological determinism—the thesis that God determines 
all human actions and volitions through His will.6 But theological deter­
minism comes with what many consider to be too steep a price; it would 
be preferable, then, to be able to give an account of grace and its relation­
ship to faith that didn't require theological determinism.
Eleonore Stump has recently developed such an account. Drawing on 
resources from Aquinas's moral psychology, Stump's account of grace af­
fords the quiescence of the will a significant role in an individual's coming 
to saving faith. In section II, I briefly outline Stump's account and show 
how it is neither deterministic nor Pelagian. In section III, I raise a wor­
ry for Stump's account that seems to render her account unsatisfactory.
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Following this, in sections IV and V I suggest a metaphysic that provides 
a way of resolving this worry. The resulting view allows one to maintain 
both (i) that divine grace is the sole non-instrumental efficient cause of 
saving faith (thereby avoiding what I take to be the central objectionable 
feature of Pelagianism) and (ii) that humans control whether or not they 
come to saving faith (thereby avoiding theological determinism).
II. Stump on Grace and Faith
In a series of recent articles, Eleonore Stump articulates and defends an 
account of divine grace and its relationship to the act of faith. Stump de­
velops this account by first noting a problem with what she takes to be 
Augustine's view of grace and showing how Aquinas's moral psychology 
provides the resources for resolving this problem. It will be helpful to fol­
low Stump's lead and begin with what she takes to the Augustinian posi­
tion on grace before moving on to her preferred Thomistic account.
In her treatment of Augustine's account of free will and its relation to 
grace, Stump begins by suggesting that Augustine's view should be un­
derstood as a libertarian, and hence incompatibilist, account.7 If Stump 
is right that Augustine believes both (a) that incompatibilism is true and
(b) that an act of free will is involved in our coming to have saving faith,8 
consistency would require that Augustine deny the truth of theological 
determinism. Such a denial does not, however, commit him to a Pelagian 
view of the relationship between free will and grace:
In the Retractationes he [i.e., Augustine] asserts vigorously that the 
Pelagians are mistaken to think he ever held a view of free will like 
theirs, that is, a view of free will which makes the freedom of the will 
independent of divine grace. . . . For Augustine, a person who is un­
aided by grace cannot do otherwise than sin, and yet she is morally 
responsible for the sin she does.9
In his writing against Pelagius10 and his disciples, Augustine repeatedly 
emphasizes that, due to Adam's sin and the subsequent Fall, all humans 
are in bondage to sin and death. In other words, in maintaining that fall­
en and corrupted human nature must be further supported in order for 
one to will the good, Augustine was arguing that the grace of creation is 
not sufficient for an individual to will the good. What is at issue, then, is 
whether another grace—sometimes called 'cooperative grace' or what Au­
gustine calls 'a unique grace'11—is also required for a fallen human to will 
the good. Augustine vehemently insists that it is, and resolutely defends 
the claim that apart from a unique grace no agent is able to will the good.12 
We can think of Augustine's insistence on a unique grace as motivated by 
what I will call the anti-Pelagian constraint (APC):
(APC): No fallen human individual is able to cause or will any good, 
including the will of her coming to saving faith, apart from a 
unique grace.
For purposes of this paper, I will consider as acceptable only those views 
which satisfy this constraint. Furthermore, I will take a strong reading
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of (APC) according to which a fallen individual cannot even be a cause 
of her coming to saving faith apart from a unique grace. My motivation 
for this strong reading here is two-fold. First, I think that an argument 
for the strong reading can be made from tradition.13 Second, if one holds 
that fallen humans are able to be a cause of their own saving faith, just 
not the sole cause, then one faces the following dilemma: either the cause 
that the individual contributes to his own salvation is independent of a 
unique grace or it is not. The first disjunct is often elaborated along the 
line that individuals cooperate, on their own, with God's grace so that the 
individual's cooperation and the divine grace are jointly efficacious. How­
ever, since cooperating with divine grace is itself a good, if agents can co­
operate apart from a unique grace given by God as suggested by the first 
disjunct, (APC) is violated.14 The agent is doing a positive act apart from 
grace. On the other hand, the second disjunct begins a potentially infinite 
regress that would only be terminated by embracing the first disjunct at 
some level.
The difficulty with Augustine's view comes when one attempts to rec­
oncile his acceptance of (APC) with his apparent rejection of theological 
determinism. Because he accepts (APC), Augustine holds that an individ­
ual isn't able to cause the will of faith on her own. Instead, God causes 
the will of faith via an infusion of grace. According to Stump, Augustine's 
view here faces a problem. If the will of faith is caused only by God,
then the argument that Augustine's account of free will is [an incom- 
patibilist account] appears to collapse like a house of cards. . . . It is 
hard to see why her [i.e., the agent's] will should be thought of as free 
in any sense. It is also difficult to ward off the conclusion that in this 
case God is responsible when a human will doesn't will the good. . . . 
Finally, on this position, it is hard to see why a good God wouldn't 
cause the will of faith in everyone, so that everyone is saved.15
According to Stump, Augustine ultimately does affirm the view that the 
will of faith is caused by God: "There seems to be every reason for Augus­
tine to reject the claim that the will of faith is a gift of God and caused by 
grace. There can be no doubt, however, that Augustine did in fact accept 
it."16 It looks, then, that Augustine ultimately rejects libertarianism insofar 
as God, rather than the individual, is the ultimate source or first cause 
of her act.17 According to Stump, "Augustine becomes increasingly insis­
tent that the will of faith is a gift from God in the sense that God alone is 
the cause of it."18 Thus, Stump suggests that Augustine's commitment to 
(APC) leads him, despite initial appearances, to theological determinism.
Stump goes on to argue that Augustine would need not resort to theo­
logical determinism if he "could find a way to hold that human beings are 
able, on their own, to reject grace, without God's being ultimately respon­
sible for their doing so."19 Stump thinks the difficulty should be resolved 
as follows: "Suppose that God offers to every person the grace that pro­
duces the will of faith, but that it is open to a person to refuse that grace."20 
In other words, suppose that God offers grace to each individual such 
that, if that person doesn't resist the grace offered, that grace will cause 
the individual to have the will of faith. Since it is still the grace causing
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the will of faith, (APC) isn't violated. This view, Stump argues, requires an 
understanding of the will, such as that found in Aquinas' moral psychol­
ogy, that involves three, rather than just two, settings:
The will can assent to something or reject it, but it can also simply do
nothing at all___If this view of the will is right, then there are at least
three possibilities for the will as regards grace . . . : the will can assent 
to grace; it can refuse; or it can be quiescent. When it is quiescent, it 
doesn't refuse grace, but it doesn't accept it either. It is thus possible 
to hold that a human person has it in her power to refuse grace or to 
fail to refuse grace without also holding that she has it in her power 
to form the good act of will which is the assent to grace.21
According to Stump, it is the possibility of the quiescence of the will that 
allows one to claim both that "divine grace produces the act of will neces­
sary for justification and that that act of will is free in a non-compatibilist 
sense."22 Theological determinism is avoided because "it is up to a human 
willer, and to her alone, whether her will refuses grace or is quiescent with 
regard to grace. . . . A human being is still ultimately in control of the state 
of her will, insofar as it is up to her either to refuse grace or to fail to refuse 
grace."23 Her account also satisfies (APC) because "divine grace produces 
the act of will necessary for justification,"24 and not some action or choice 
done by the agent apart from grace.
III. A Problem for Stump's Account
The previous section illustrates how, on the account of grace developed by 
Stump, the possibility of a quiescent will allows one to resist theological 
determinism by vesting the ultimate responsibility for an agent's will in 
the agent herself and not in God, while at the same time not requiring that 
the agent is able to form a good volition apart from grace. While I think 
that Stump's account both avoids theological determinism and satisfies 
(APC), in the present section I want to raise an objection to her view. Re­
member that the reason Stump postulates the quiescence of the will is to 
avoid saying that an agent wills to receive saving grace. If an agent were 
to will to receive grace, then, since doing so is good, the agent would then 
be a cause of a good apart from grace, violating (APC). On her view, then, 
God offers grace to all and an individual will come to faith when she nei­
ther affirms nor rejects that grace, but merely ceases willing with regard 
to the grace, that is, when her will is quiescent. When the agent's will is 
quiescent, grace produces in that individual the will of faith.
Since quiescence plays such a central role in Stump's view, it is natural 
to ask why it is that an individual's will might become quiescent such that, 
in virtue of this fact, God's grace will produce in that individual the will 
of faith. Stump writes that "the exercise of the will—whether the will is 
turned off or not—is always in the power of the will itself."25 So it initially 
looks like she would say that it is up to the will to turn it itself off. Some­
what surprisingly, however, she instead says that the will's becoming qui­
escent cannot be a further act of the will. She compares the activity of the 
will to bodily motion. Just as "my ceasing to walk east is not by itself an
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instance of my walking west,"26 so too ceasing to will is not something that 
is itself willed. A will's becoming quiescent "is not itself an act of will."27 
Since quiescence thus doesn't depend on a previous volition by the agent, 
it looks inexplicable why the agent's will would cease resisting grace ac­
cording to Stump's view. It looks like whether or not an individual's will 
is quiescent is perhaps a matter of chance; at the very least, since it doesn't 
depend on a previous act of will, it is hard to see how the agent could 
control her quiescence.
Stump canvases a number of reasons that an agent could become qui­
escent with regard to her will, including simple inattention, distracted in­
attention, willed inattention or mere abstention.28 But none of these are 
the kind of quiescence involved with the will of faith, for in none of these 
cases does quiescence follow active rejection, as she thinks it must with 
regard to the case involving grace. Instead, Stump suggests that in the case 
of quiescence with regard to grace, the will becomes inactive because the 
intellect comes to be divided against itself:
the intellect becomes locked in indecision, unable to resolve the con­
flict within itself into one single, integrated judgment. In the face of 
this blockage in the intellect, the . . . will becomes quiescent. But now 
the quiescence can appropriately be said to drive out the rejection. In 
this . . . case, it is not simply that the will is inactive because the intel­
lect has lapsed into inattention of some sort. Rather, the will becomes 
inactive because the intellect has come to be divided against itself.29
On Stump's view, then, the kind of quiescence involved in an individu­
al's coming to have saving faith has a number of interrelated features. We 
might describe these relevant features in the following way:
(a) there is a unique grace given by God which causes the will of 
faith,
(b) God offers this unique grace to all,
(c) this unique grace will cause the will of faith in every individual 
whose will has become quiescent with regard to God's offer of 
grace,
(d) an individual's will becomes quiescent in this way when the agent's 
intellect becomes divided against itself, and
(e) the individual's will becoming quiescent in this way is neither itself 
a volition nor the result of a previous volition by the agent.
These five features jointly comprise the central elements of Stump's ac­
count. But it appears that the satisfaction of any of these features cannot 
be attributable to the agent in any way that would satisfy a libertarian 
understanding of moral responsibility.30 The first three of these features 
are ultimately attributable to God, not the individual agent; thus, the 
agent cannot be morally responsible for either (a), (b) or (c), nor can their 
satisfaction be attributed to the agent's intellect and will. Feature (d) 
initially looks like a candidate for grounding the individual's moral re­
sponsibility for her coming to faith, since it involves the agent's intellect
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and will; but whatever plausibility (d) has for grounding the individu­
al's moral responsibility is undercut by (e). Furthermore, jettisoning (e) 
doesn't appear to be an option for Stump's account, since it is (e) that al­
lows her view to satisfy (APC). Thus, whatever merits Stump's proposed 
account of grace has (which, I think, are many), her account ultimately 
appears unsatisfactory.31
IV. Refraining, Quasi-Causation, and Control
What is needed, then, is an account of grace according to which it is clear 
that the individual controls whether or not she comes to have saving faith 
in some way that allows for her being morally responsible for whether or 
not she does, but that also satisfies (APC). In other words, an account is 
needed which can maintain both that grace is the sole non-instrumental 
efficient cause of saving faith and that human agents control whether or 
not they come to saving faith.
Such an account is, I think, available. In the present section and the 
next, I develop one such account around the central idea that grace is nec­
essary but not sufficient for saving faith. Contra Pelagianism, the account 
developed here holds that a unique grace is needed to cause the will of 
faith because placing one's faith in God is good, and human individuals 
can't will this sort of good unless a unique grace is first given. In virtue of 
this feature, the present account satisfies (APC). Like Pelagius' view, this 
view also affirms that grace is not singularly sufficient for saving faith, 
and thereby avoids theological determinism. God's grace will lead one to 
saving faith so long as it is not resisted or rejected, though whether or not 
the grace is resisted is ultimately up to the agent. For ease of reference, 
and for reasons that will become clear below, I'll call this view the Quasi­
Causal View, or simply (QV) for short.
How then should we understand the agent's refraining from resisting 
divine grace? Stump's view, with its focus on the quiescent will, gives us 
a good starting point, even if it is ultimately unsatisfactory for the rea­
son outlined in the previous section. What is needed is an account that 
explains the agent's refraining from resisting grace in a way that is ulti­
mately under her control, yet that doesn't lead to the agent causing, even 
indirectly, her own salvation. I think such an account can be given.
To say that an agent refrains from willing an action, or is quiescent with 
regard to that action, is to say that the agent does not will that action to 
occur. But as we learned from Stump above, refraining from willing need 
not itself be a willing. I suggest that we should understand an instance 
of refraining as an omission—specifically an omission of both accepting 
and rejecting grace. Furthermore, according to one popular theory of ef­
ficient causation, omissions cannot be causes.32 This theory holds that cau­
sation is a relation between events, and since omissions are the absence of 
a particular event, rather than an actual event, omissions are precluded 
from being causal relata.33 If this is correct, then omissions, including the 
omission of refraining from resisting grace, cannot be the cause of events, 
including one's coming to saving faith. Such an account of causation can 
provide a basis from which to understand the nature of the refraining in­
volved in (QV).
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Recent work by Phil Dowe will be helpful at this point; Dowe argues 
that omissions are not actual, genuine causes.34 Dowe begins his account 
by calling our attention to two intuitions, which he calls the 'genuinist 
intuition' and the 'intuition of difference.' The former is the intuition that 
omissions certainly seem like they can be causes. For example, it seems 
that a father's omitting to closely watch his child while walking alongside 
the road is a cause of the child being hit by a car. Building on this intuition, 
'genuinism' is the view that omissions can be causes. The second intuition, 
however, gives reason to reject genuinism. According to this intuition, 
one recognizes upon further reflection that cases of seeming causation by 
omission are not genuine cases of causation:
You say that the father's inattention was the cause of the child's ac­
cident. Surely you don't mean that he literally made the child run 
into the path of the car, or that he made the car hit the child. Rather, 
you mean that his failure to guard the child was the cause in the 
sense that if he had guarded the child, the accident would not have 
happened. You don't mean that he literally caused the accident; you 
mean that it was possible for him to have prevented it.35
What Dowe sets out to do then is give an account of omissions in line 
with the intuition of difference without recourse to negative-events or any 
other spurious ontology, while at the same time giving an account as to 
why the genuinist intuition seems so plausible.36
At the heart of Dowe's view is the claim that every seeming case of causa­
tion by omission should be understood "primarily as a counterfactual claim 
about genuine causation," that is, as "the mere possibility of causation."37 
In other words, while omissions aren't genuine causes, they are intimately 
related to cases of genuine causation in that they involve the possibility of 
genuine causation. So omissions aren't causes, they are only 'quasi-causes' 
and apparent cases of causation involving omissions are really cases of 
'quasi-causation.' Here is Dowe's analysis of 'causation by omission,' where 
A and B name positive events and x is a variable ranging over events:
not-A quasi-causes B if B occurred and A did not, and there occurred 
an x such that
(01) x caused B, and
(02) if A had occurred then A would have prevented B by inter­
acting with x .38
Note that according to this definition of omissions, causation is taken to 
be primitive and cases of quasi-causation are defined in terms of cases of 
genuine causation. Dowe takes this to be a benefit of his analysis because 
it means that such an account solves the problem of omission "in a way 
that is consistent with all theories of causation."39 Note also that this ap­
proach to omissions avoids a problem for genuinism mentioned earlier: 
since omissions are not genuine causes, there is no problem with negative- 
events like omissions being causal relata.40
There are a number of attractive features of Dowe's account of quasi­
causation. First, it allows for omissions to causally explain events without
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the metaphysical commitment to genuine causation by omission. Helen 
Beebee, for example, writes that "to cite an omission in an explanation 
is to say something—albeit something negative—about the causal history 
of the event to be explained."41 Dowe's account of quasi-causation shows 
why an omission can be a causal explanation for a later event even if the 
intuition of difference ends up being true: the omission not-A causally ex­
plains why B occurred in virtue of it being the case that had A occurred, 
A would have prevented B by interacting with x. Furthermore, it is very 
plausible that it is causal explanation, and not causation itself, that often 
motivates the genuinist intuition. Dowe's account thus respects both of the 
previously mentioned intuitions. It preserves the intuition of difference 
since it holds that quasi-causation is not genuine causation, but only the 
possibility of causation. And while it can't affirm the literal truth of the 
genuinist intuition, it can offer two reasons why such an intuition arises: 
(i) causation and quasi-causation are so intimately related that for many 
purposes it suffices to treat cases of quasi-causation as if they were cases of 
genuine causation, and (ii) omissions can be causal explanations. Particu­
larly when coupled with the epistemic difficulty of telling positive events 
from omissions, these reasons provide a plausible explanation of the origin 
of the genuinist intuition. Thus, Dowe concludes that the habit of treating 
quasi-causation as causation is justified "by the fact that [quasi-causation] 
plays the same role as causation in evidence, explanation, and agency."42
Elsewhere, Carolina Sartorio suggests that genuinism is often motivat­
ed by considerations of moral responsibility: "the possibility of causation 
by omission helps to preserve the important connection that seems to ex­
ist between causation and moral responsibility."43 Dowe himself suggests 
that genuinism need not be true in order for an agent to be morally re­
sponsible for an omission insofar as "quasi-causation may also . . . track 
moral responsibility in just the way that causation does."44 Dowe himself 
doesn't develop this suggestion in any detail, but I think it can be done by 
employing the language of control that is often found in debates about 
moral responsibility.45 A natural first stab at the notion of moral respon­
sibility takes control seriously: an agent can only be morally responsible 
for an event that she has some control over. Let us call this the control 
condition for moral responsibility: an agent S is morally responsible for an 
event e only if S has (or at some point had) control over the occurrence of 
e. Such a suggestion underscores our willingness to hold agents morally 
responsible for the consequences of their actions, for example, but not for 
things that happened prior to their births. I think that Dowe's account of 
causation and quasi-causation offers a way of understanding the sort of 
control at issue in discussions of moral responsibility. Sometimes an agent 
has control over some event e in virtue of causing e. Let us call this 'direct 
control.' But if omissions are not causes, as Dowe suggests, then it may be 
that genuine causation and control can come apart—an agent may control 
an event even if she does not actually cause it. She may, instead, control 
it in virtue of quasi-causing it. Let us call this 'indirect control.' Indirect 
control allows us to maintain that agents are morally responsible for their 
omissions or the consequences of their omissions, which thinking of con­
trol solely in terms of causation would not. We can thus say that an agent 
controls an event e when either
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(1) an action of the agent causes e to occur, or
(2) an omission by that agent quasi-causes—in the sense spelled out 
above—e to occur.46
If we understand control in this way, we see that an agent can be responsi­
ble for the results of both her actions and her omissions even if genuinism 
is false.47
V. Completing (QV)
In order to see exactly how the above discussion of control and quasi­
causation can be used to develop (QV), it will be helpful to reexamine the 
two views of grace that I am attempted to navigate between. According to 
deterministic accounts, no individual is able to will to come to saving faith 
apart from grace, and thus no individual is more than a merely instrumen­
tal cause of her own salvation. Neither are individuals in ultimate control 
of their own salvation; all of an agent's volitions are ultimately controlled, 
not by that individual, but by God. So, according to this view, individuals 
can neither cause nor control their own salvation.
In contrast, Pelagius' view of grace holds that individuals can both con­
trol and cause their own salvation. Since Pelagius' view of the will and its 
relation to grace is not deterministic, God's giving of grace to an individu­
al is not sufficient for that individual to come to saving faith; an act of the 
individual's will is also needed. Given that Pelagius understood grace to 
be primarily in God's giving of human nature, he held that a unique grace 
is not needed for an agent to will the good. Individuals are able to will 
their own salvation simply in virtue of their having human nature. Thus, 
individuals are able to will, or cause, their salvation to occur apart from a 
unique dispensation of grace by God. Keeping in mind the distinction be­
tween direct and indirect control from the previous section, Pelagianism 
holds that individuals directly control their own salvation in virtue of be­
ing able to will to come to saving faith.
I think there are reasons to reject both of these views. The problem with 
the former view stems from its holding the dispensation of grace as suffi­
cient for salvation, for this entails either universalism or that God refrains 
giving some individuals the grace needed for salvation. While universal- 
ism might not be an official heresy, its condemnation by the majority of 
the Christian tradition gives a very strong prima facie reason for rejecting 
it. The second option raises a serious version of the problem of evil. Since 
this option holds that the grace sufficient for salvation is not given to all, 
it must be that God refrains from giving grace to some individuals. Given 
that this view holds that grace is not just sufficient, but also necessary 
for salvation, the lack of grace is sufficient for an individual's not being 
saved. Insofar as individual's failing to be saved is a morally bad state of 
affairs, it looks as if God is directly responsible for an evil that He could 
have avoiding bringing about by giving that individual the needed grace. 
On the other hand, Pelagianism errs in holding that a unique grace is not 
necessary for salvation, insofar as an individual is able to will the good of 
her own salvation apart from a unique grace. Pelagius' view fails, then, 
precisely because it violates (APC).
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The non-deterministic account of grace that I'm proposing can be un­
derstood as a middle way between these other positions. In order to avoid 
the dilemma facing the deterministic view, the present account rejects that 
God's giving of grace is necessary and sufficient for coming to saving faith. 
In order to avoid the problems associated with God giving the grace need­
ed for salvation to only some, the present account affirms that God's grace 
is universally given. Furthermore, it also holds that such grace is the cause 
of our good will and coming to saving faith, thereby preserving the theo­
logical claim that God is the ultimate cause of goodness. But I think that 
we should reject that God's giving of this grace is sufficient for salvation— 
the individual whose salvation is at issue must also contribute a necessary 
condition. In other words, individuals have no control over whether grace 
is given, but since they can resist grace, they do have indirect control over 
whether that grace causes its intended result. Agents thus have control 
over their own salvation, not in virtue of causing it, but in virtue of an 
omission that they indirectly control. The conjunction of God's grace and 
the individual's refraining from resisting will be jointly sufficient for the 
individual's coming to saving faith.48 And since, as I've already noted, God 
extends this grace to all individuals, whether or not an individual comes 
to saving faith is ultimately up to the agent rather than God.
Unlike Pelagianism, the account that I've proposed here does not vio­
late (APC). Agents directly control those events that they cause to occur, 
while they indirectly control those events or omissions which they quasi­
cause. How does this distinction apply to the grace needed for salvation 
that God gives to all? If we hold that the grace that God gives to each 
individual will cause that individual to come to saving faith unless the 
individual rejects such grace, then the agent will in fact be saved via God's 
grace once she refrains from rejecting the grace offered.
Remember that Dowe defines an omission (not-A) as the quasi-cause of 
some event B if B occurs and A did not, and there is some other event x 
such that x caused B, and had A occurred, then A would have prevented B 
from occurring by interacting with x . As applied to grace and saving faith, 
let A name the event which is the agent's rejecting God's grace, let B name 
the event which is the individual's coming to saving faith, and x be the ef­
ficacy of the grace necessary for salvation and given by God. So long as the 
agent rejects the grace given by God, then the grace does not bring about the 
individual's salvation. As soon as the agent refrains from or omits rejecting 
the grace (not-A), then the grace will be causally efficacious in bringing the 
individual to saving faith; that is, not-A allows x to cause B . On this account, 
since it is God's grace that is causally efficacious for an individual's salvation 
so long as the individual does not reject that grace, the agent is not causing 
her own salvation. This avoids the central problem with Pelagianism.
But since whether or not the individual rejects God's grace is up to the 
agent, and not ultimately up to God, the agent will have indirect con­
trol over her salvation. Grace will cause an individual to come to saving 
faith when the agent's will becomes quiescent. But, since quiescence isn't 
the same as willing to accept grace, (APC) isn't violated if the agent be­
comes quiescent apart from grace. Furthermore, on this account unlike 
on Stump's account, whether or not the agent's will is quiescent can be 
straightforwardly under the control of the agent. As we've seen, we can
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adapt Dowe's account of 'causation by omission' to show how quiescence 
is an omission that quasi-causes the act of saving faith. But we can also 
spell out how it is that an agent is able to quasi-cause an omission. As 
before, let A and B name positive events and let x be a variable ranging 
over events or dispositions. A quasi-causes an omission not-B just in case 
A occurred and B did not, and there occurred some x such that
(Q1) the occurrence of A interferes with x, and
(Q2) if A had not occurred then x would have caused B.
To see how this allows an individual to quasi-cause her own quiescence 
in the sense involved in coming to saving faith, let A be a previous voli­
tion by the agent, let B be the agent's resisting God's grace (so that not-B 
is the agent's quiescence with regard to the unique grace), and let x be a 
natural disposition to choose contrary to God (one can think of this dispo­
sition is a result of original sin if so inclined). On this model, individuals 
are naturally disposed to continue to reject the grace that God gives to 
all individuals. Insofar as they are fallen and sinful, they are not able to 
choose to accept God's grace; such a choice would violate (APC). But, as 
we saw earlier in the discussion of Stump's view, ceasing to will to resist 
a good isn't the same as willing that good. Thus, it doesn't violate (APC) 
to say that individuals can, through an act of their will, become quiescent 
with regard to divinely given grace. Once they are quiescent, the grace 
will cause them to come to saving faith. Since the agent causes neither her 
quiescence nor her coming to faith, the agent is not a cause of her own 
salvation and (APC) is not violated.49 It is precisely because omissions are 
only quasi-causes and not causes that this view can maintain that an agent 
wills to refrain from resisting God's grace without thereby causing either 
her salvation or any other good act. But since an agent's quasi-causing can 
provide control to the agent, an agent can clearly control her salvation 
without having to be the cause of her receiving salvation. Therefore, un­
like on deterministic views which hold that the only reason a particular 
individual doesn't come to saving faith is that God does not give that in­
dividual the needed grace, the present account allows the non-regenerate 
to be responsible for their own lack of salvation.
VI. Conclusion
In summary, the present view maintains both that God alone causes sav­
ing faith through the grace He gives to all and that individual agents con­
trol whether or not they receive that grace. It also has the benefit, I think, 
of providing a metaphysic for grounding a traditionally accepted account 
of divine grace: "Neither does that person do absolutely nothing in receiv­
ing that movement of grace, for he can also reject it; nor is he able, by his 
own free will and without God's grace, to move himself towards justice in 
God's sight."50 Furthermore, while the present account is in the same spirit 
as that developed and defended by Eleonore Stump, it more clearly gives 
control over her salvation to the individual by rooting the quiescence of 
the individual's will in a previous act of her will.51
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NOTES
1. Exceptions to this claim are the Incarnate Son and, according to some 
theological traditions, the Virgin Mary.
2. Augustine, Retractions, Book 1, chapter 8 (in The Fathers of the Church, 
volume 60, trans. May Inez Bogan, R.S.M. (Washington, D.C.: Catholic Uni­
versity Press, 1968)), 35.
3. Aquinas, Truth, 24.1 ad 2, trans. Robert Schmidt, S.J. (Chicago: Henry 
Regnery Co., 1954), 139.
4. Council of Trent, Sixth Session, Chapter VII, as quoted in Decrees of 
the Ecumenical Councils, Volume II, ed. Norman Tanner, S.J. (Washington DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 1990), p. 673. Also note that efficient causation 
is the only kind of causation that I am concerned with in the present paper.
5. Here, I have in mind the act of coming to faith in Christ, and not the 
theological virtue of faith. The act of coming to faith is sometimes also referred 
to as the act of justification, “whereby someone from being unjust becomes 
just, from being an enemy becomes a friend, so that he is an heir in hope of 
eternal life" (Council of Trent, Sixth Session, Chapter VII, p. 673).
6. Similarly, Christopher Kirwan defines theological determinism as the 
thesis that “every event and state of the world either is God's act or is brought 
about by God's act" (Augustine (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 117).
7. More specifically, Stump argues that Augustine's view is a form of 'mod­
ified libertarianism,' which consists of assent to the following two claims:
(L1') an agent acts with free will, or is morally responsible for an act, 
only if the act is not ultimately causally determined by anything out­
side the agent
and
(L3) an agent acts with free will, or is morally responsible for an act, 
only if her own intellect and will are the sole ultimate source or first 
cause of her act.
'Modified libertarianism' differs from 'common libertarianism' insofar as the 
latter accepts, but the former rejects, a further condition for free action:
(L2) an agent acts with free will, or is morally responsible for an act, 
only if he could have done otherwise.
See Stump, “Augustine on Free Will," in The Cambridge Companion to Augus­
tine, ed. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 125f. For a criticism of Stump's modified libertarian­
ism, see my “A Critique of Frankfurt-Libertarianism" (Philosophia 34.2 (2006): 
pp. 189-202).
8. See Stump, “Augustine on Free Will," pp. 130f.
9. Ibid. For a further complexity that need not concern us here regarding 
Augustine's view on this point, see pages 132f.
10. Pelagius' view is often portrayed as one according to which a human 
agent is able to will the good apart from grace. Strictly speaking, this charac­
terization is false. Pelagius consistently maintained that the giving of human 
nature is itself a grace; thus, even on his account, grace is required for an indi­
vidual to will the good. This grace is sometimes referred to as 'enabling grace' 
or 'the grace of creation.' Augustine understands Pelagius' view of grace as 
simply the natural human capacity of free will and knowledge of the law (see, 
for example, William Collinge, “Introduction," On the Proceedings of Pelagius,
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in Saint Augustine: Four Anti-Pelagian Writings, John Mourant and William 
Collinge, eds. (Washington D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1992), p. 105). A 
similar position seems to have been held by Pelagius' disciple Caelestius. Au­
gustine quotes Caelestius as having written that “the grace and assistance of 
God is not given for individual acts, but consists in the freedom of the will, 
or in the law and doctrine" (Augustine, On the Proceedings of Pelagius, p. 141). 
Both Caelestius and Pelagius thought that each individual was born as free as 
Adam was before the Fall, and thus is able to choose the good through his/her 
own will. Thus, on this view, humans are able to cause their coming to faith in 
virtue of the grace of creation.
11. See for example Augustine, On Nature and Grace, in Saint Augustine: 
Four Anti-Pelagian Writings, p. 69.
12. See Augustine, On the Proceedings of Pelagius, p. 131.
13. For starters, the Council of Ephesus in 431 and the Council of Orange 
in 529 condemned as heretical the view that humans can be saved apart from 
a unique grace, and appear to also condemn the view that humans can even 
be partial causes of their own salvation. While the Council of Orange was not 
an ecumenical council, Pope Boniface II ratified the teaching authority of the 
council in 531. See the entry on the Council of Orange at the Catholic Encyclo­
pedia, found at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11266b.htm.
14. It is for this reason that I reject Scott Ragland's proposal in “The Trouble 
with Quiescence: Stump on Grace and Freedom" (forthcoming in Philosophia 
Christi). See also footnote 31 below.
15. Stump, “Augustine on Free Will," pp. 136f.
16. Ibid., p. 137.
17. More specifically, this would involve a rejection of (L3); see footnote 7 
above.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., p. 139.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 140.
22. Stump, Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 489.
23. Ibid., pp. 402f.
24. Ibid., p. 389.
25. Ibid., p. 394.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., p. 401.
28. Ibid., p. 397.
29. Ibid., p. 399.
30. More specifically, as with Augustine's view, Stump's view seems un­
able to satisfy (L3) discussed above in footnote 7.
31. For a similar criticism of Stump's account, see Scott Ragland, “The 
Trouble with Quiescence: Stump on Grace and Freedom," particularly sec­
tion V: “Though Stump's picture ensures that quiescence is not determined, 
and therefore happens contingently and originates in the agent, I doubt that 
her picture gives human agents the relevant sort of control over quiescence 
(and hence, faith). . . . It seems to me that in order to avoid slipping into 
semi-pelagianism, Stump is forced to represent humans as altogether too 
passive with respect to whether they become quiescent: quiescence is not a 
state that they actively choose, but is rather a kind of paralysis of intellect 
and will that befalls humans (with some degree of randomness). . . . I think 
that on Stump's scenario, agents do not exercise full libertarian control over 
whether or not they have faith. Though Stump's view avoids theological 
determinism by making it a contingent matter whether or not the intellect 
will 'freeze up,' this is not enough for humans to exercise genuine control.
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This leads to trouble whether or not there is damnation" (pages 17 and 20 in 
manuscript). Note, however, that Ragland's preferred response to this objec­
tion is different than my own.
32. There are, of course, other accounts of causation on which omissions 
are causes. For example, D. H. Mellor's account of causation in The Facts of 
Causation (London: Routledge University Press, 1995) allows for causation by 
omission, though it does so because Mellor conceives of causation as primar­
ily relating facts and only secondarily, if at all, relating events. My aim in the 
present paper is not to argue against accounts such as Mellor's that allow for 
genuine causation by omission, though I recognize that the truth of such ac­
counts potentially pose problems for my argument here. Let me just say that 
what I find particularly attractive about Dowe's account is its ability to ex­
plain the genuinist intuition without recourse to negative events. For reasons 
why such entities should be avoided, see Judith Jarvis Thomson, “Causation: 
Omissions," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66.1 (2003): pp. 81-103.
33. Scott Ragland has objected that describing the present account in this 
way might make it incompatible with agent-causal incomp atibilist views, 
which hold that agents as well as events can be causal relata. I don't intend 
this restriction. For those who favor agent-causal accounts, they are welcome 
to understand the previous sentence in the following way: “Causation is a 
relation between either two events or between an agent and an event; since 
omissions are the absence of a particular event, rather than an actual event or 
agent, omissions are precluded from being causal relata." While I omit this 
clarification in what follows, the reader is welcome to understand the view 
developed here in such a way that it is amenable to agent-causal views if she 
so desires.
34. Phil Dowe, “A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and 'Causation' 
by Omission," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79.2 (2001): pp. 216-226. Fol­
lowing Dowe, I intend the following discussion to be independent of the exact 
nature of causation, whether it be counterfactual analysis, regulatory analysis, 
probabilistic accounts, a transference theory or other. Though he does not ful­
ly spell out his reasoning for rejecting that omissions are causes in the present 
article, he does so in chapter 6 of Physical Causation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). In short, Dowe thinks that omissions fail to be causes 
because omissions do not involve the sort of processes and conserved quanti­
ties necessary for true cases of causation.
35. Dowe, Physical Causation, p. 125.
36. Dowe's project involves reinterpreting the genuinist intuition as “an 
intuition that we definitely have either causation or quasi-causation" (Dowe, 
“A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and 'Causation' by Omission," pp. 
218f.). I explain Dowe's understanding of quasi-causation below.
37. Dowe, “A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and 'Causation' by 
Omission," p. 216.
38. Ibid., p. 222. Earlier in the same article, Dowe analyses cases of pre­
vention as follows: “A prevented B if A occurred and B did not, and there oc­
curred an x such that (P1) there is a causal interaction between A and the pro­
cess due to x, and (P2) if A had not occurred, x would have caused B" (Ibid., 
p. 221). As I understand quasi-causation, it is a genus that includes apparent 
cases of 'causation by omission,' cases of prevention and cases of 'causing an 
omission,' discussed below in section 5.
39. Dowe, Physical Causation, p. 124.
40. In addition to Dowe's account, Judith Jarvis Thomson's account of 
'causation' by omission would provide a metaphysical foundation for the ac­
count of grace I develop here, though I will not pursue this second option in 
the present paper. See her “Causation: Omissions."
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41. Helen Beebee, “Causes, Omissions and Conditions," manuscript p. 11, 
as cited in Sarah McGrath, “Causation by Omission: A Dilemma," Philosophi­
cal Studies 123 (2005), p. 131.
42. Dowe, Physical Causation, p. 145.
43. Carolina Sartorio, “Causes as Difference Makers," Philosophical Studies 
123 (2005), p. 94n11.
44. Dowe, “A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and 'Causation' by 
Omission," p. 225.
45. See, for instance, John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's highly influ­
ential discussion of 'guidance control' and 'regulative control' in Responsibility 
and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998).
46. This isn't to say that (1) and (2) here are sufficient conditions for the 
agent being morally responsible for e—there are certainly other conditions 
needed for moral responsibility. The point is simply that control over an event 
is required for moral responsibility, and there are two ways that an agent 
could exercise the required control.
47. At the conference where a previous version of this paper was read, 
Matthew McGrath raised a worry regarding the proliferation of quasi-causes 
if quasi-causation, like causation, is transitive. I'm inclined to think that it isn't, 
given that hypothetical syllogism is invalid in counterfactual logic. But even 
if it were, I do not see the resulting proliferation of quasi-causes as a reason 
to reject quasi-causation. Given that my primary interest with quasi-causation 
in the present paper is how it relates to the kind of control needed for moral 
responsibility in general, or the act of faith in particular, I am interested in what 
quasi-causation can contribute to an agent's responsibility for her own salva­
tion. However, insofar as being either a cause or a quasi-cause of X is only a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for being responsible for X, I believe that 
the other conditions needed for moral responsibility will prevent the prolifera­
tion of responsibility by quasi-causation. See footnote 46 above, as well as Sarah 
McGrath's “Causation by Omission: A Dilemma" for a related discussion.
48. This isn't to deny that individuals are later capable of losing their sal­
vation if they sin or again reject divine grace.
49. In commenting on a previous draft of this paper, an anonymous ref­
eree raised the following objection: “Suppose that what is most important 
about (APC) for (some) of its defenders is that the agent not be able to take 
credit for her own salvation. (I'm not supposing that this is the only reason 
one might endorse (APC), only that it might be one reason.) But agents can 
be praised and blamed for the omissions when bought about by their own 
acts of will, whether or not one wants to bring such cases under the rubric of 
quasi-causation. So it's not clear, even if (APC) on the strong reading is 'tech­
nically' satisfied (in virtue of the agent's will being only a quasi-cause rather 
than a full-blooded cause), that it isn't violated in a more important sense (in 
virtue of its being possible to credit the agent for bringing about the quiescence 
through an act of will)."
This objection misses a central point of my account, namely that one doesn't 
deserve credit for one's becoming quiescent precisely because quiescence isn't 
a positive or good act of the will—it is instead a lack of an act of will. Nor is 
the will to become quiescent with respect to divine grace something that the 
agent is due moral credit for insofar as willing to be quiescent with respect to 
grace is distinct from willing to accept that same grace. While it is true that 
the agent's willing to become quiescent is a better act than his willing to resist 
God's grace, superlatives do not presuppose positives. To illustrate with a dif­
ferent example, suppose that Joe has the opportunity to steal $100 from his 
boss, but steals instead only $20. Joe's action here is better than it could have
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been, but this does not mean that Joe deserves any sort of moral credit for the 
action that he did do. Additionally, the present account requires only that an 
agent is morally blameworthy for her not coming to saving faith in virtue of 
not becoming quiescent with respect to the grace given by God.
50. Council of Trent, Sixth Session, Chapter V, 672. Compare also Aquinas's 
Questiones disputatae de veritiate: “God causes virtues in us without our causing 
them but not without our consent" (Truth, 28.3 ad 17).
51. Tully Borland, H. E. Baber, William Hasker, Tim Pawl, Linda Peterson, 
Neal Tognazzini and two anonymous referees for Faith and Philosophy pro­
vided numerous helpful comments and discussions on various aspects of this 
paper. Scott Ragland and Mike Rota both provided extensive comments on 
numerous earlier drafts, significantly improving the final version. A previous 
version of this paper was present at the First Annual Philosophy of Religion 
conference at the University of Missouri—Columbia, where I benefited from 
numerous questions, comments and objections from those present, especially 
from Eleonore Stump and my commentator Scott Ragland.
